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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF lJTAH 
(;()I_JDRIXG p L\('.1\:IXG l'10., INl'1., 
Plaintiff-Respondent~ 
YS. 
H & :\l l'1ATTLE CO., dba H & l\1 
DRESSED ll E E F CO., and 
(~ R E 1\ T WESTERN PACK-
1:\TG 1\XD l,r\'fTLE CO:\IPA-
X\ .. , et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
\ Case No. 
10091 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STA'fE~IEN'f OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for moneys clain1ed due against 
\\~hich defendants claimed a credit for killing 8,151 ewes 
for respondent at a charge of $3.00 per head; respond-
ent claimed an oral contract for killing ewes at the rate 
of fifty cents per head. 
DISPOSITIOX IX LO,,~ER COURT 
The case \vas tried to a jury which found an oral 
contract for killing ewes at fifty cents a head upon 
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special interrogatory. From Judgment entered accord-
ingly for the plaintiff-respondent, defendant-appellant 
Great Western Packing and Cattle Company appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime during May of 1961, Mr. Henry M. 
Hendler, General Manager of Goldring Packing Com-
pany, plaintiff and respondent, attended a meeting at 
the McFarland packing plant in Salt Lake City with 
the following defendants: Ray McFarland, Leonard 
0. Thayer, Wayne Hodson, Vance Hodson, Earl Jerry 
Morgan and Roy Morgan. (R. 169, 180, 183, 184, 
194, 196}. These individuals were seeking ways and 
means of creating a unified integrated operation at the 
McFarland meat packing plant at 2922 South Main 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 193, 194). Messrs. 
Hodsons and Morgans "\\rere officers and principals 
in the defendant company, H & M Cattle Company 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as H & M), which, 
prior to the meeting with Hendler, had been operating 
a "custom kill" slaughtering operation at the McFar-
land plant (R. 218, 238, 233, Ex. 3}. Mr. Ray Mc-
Farland was an employee of H & M Cattle Company 
(R. 198, 208). The defendant, Leonard 0. Thayer, 
together with H & M and its principals, subsequently 
was an incorporator and president of the defendant-
appellant, Great Western Packing and Cattle Com-
pany (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Great 
Western) ( R. 249, Ex. 4) . 
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~\ t the n1eeting above referred to, discussion was 
held relnti,·e to an agreement for the slaughter of 
respondent's liYestock at the :\IcFarland plant. Hendler 
otl'ered to supply cattle and sheep belonging to re-
spondent for slaug·hter at the plant; and he offered to 
pay for the slaughtering services the su1n of $3.00 per 
head for cattle. together 'vith the inedible offal, and 
the sun1 of fifty cents per head for sheep (including 
both lambs and e\\·es), together 'vith both the edible 
nnd inedible offal. Any overtime kill \vas to be com-
pensated for at the rate of an additional fifty cents 
per head. Both parties to the agreement were to have 
the right to tertninate the same at any time. (R. 169, 
170, 196, 197). The consensus of those present was 
that this "·as "'fine,'' "·hich they announced. They said 
they \\·ould accept it and they all shook hands on it. 
(It 17:2, 185. 186, 187, 197). Thereafter, cattle, lambs 
and e\ves "·ere submitted by respondent to the defend-
ant H & )! l,attle Cotnpany and its successor, Great 
\Y'estern Packing and Cattle Company, the appellant, 
and from the lOth day of July, 1961, to and including 
the 20th day of September, 1961, these two entities 
slaughtered 8,151 of respondent's ewes. (R. 164, 190, 
191, Ex. 1). On the 20th day of September, Great 
\Y' estern tertninated the agreement because it purport-
edly could not continue to kill sheep at fifty cents a 
head. (R. 18:2. Ex. 1). entil the 4th day of August, 
1961, the defendant H & ~I Cattle Company was oper-
ating the McFarland plant, custom killing for respond-
ent, and doing business under the assumed name of 
5 
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H & M Dressed Beef Co. (R. 198, 219, 220). On the 
4th day of August, appellant was incorporated, as-
sumed the operation from H & M, one of the incorpo .. 
rators and principal stockholders of appellant and 
also did business as H & M Dressed Beef Co. (R. 219, 
220, Ex. 2, Ex. 4). Appellant likewise assumed the 
obligations of H & M; and it is stipulated below that 
Great Western is bound by any agreement found to 
exist with H & M. (R. 91-92). Respondent received 
from H & M Cattle Company, and later, Great 
Western, seven invoices billing respondent at fifty 
cents a head for "kill" charges for the weeks ending 
July 21, August 4, August 11, August 18, August 25, 
September 1 and September 8. (R. 17 4, Ex. 2). The 
invoice No. 3940 for the week ending July 21, 1961, 
bills respondent for custom kill charges on 2,469 head 
of u sheepn at fifty cents per head. The invoice for 
the week ending August 11 bills respondent for kill 
charges of uzambs and ewesn at fifty cents per. head. 
All other invoices refer only to "lambs" at fifty cents 
per head. However, a comparison of the number of 
"lambs" shown on these other invoices with the number 
of sheep (both lambs and ewes) killed for the same 
period as reflected on the kill sheet summary, Exhibit 
1, reveals that with two exceptions, the number of lambs 
indicated on each of these invoices and billed to respond-
ent at fifty cents a head is, in fact, the total number 
of both lambs and ewes killed for that particular week. 
This is more graphically demonstrated by the following 
chart, to-wit: 
6 
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PER 1\.ILL SHEET (EX. 1) 
No. of No. of No. per 
Ewes Lambs Invoice 
Week Ending killed killed Total (Ex. 2) 
.July ~1, 1961 1:!H8 1171 2-:t39 2469* 
"\ ugust -k 1961 987 2129 3116 1584 
. \ugust 11. 19()1 :)-1<~ 1784 2326 2296* 
i\ugust 18, 1961 ()•)•) _.., 1161 1783 1840 
.~.\ugust :!;), 1961 1235 792 2027 2027 
Sept. 1, 1961 696 1851 2547 2547** 
Sept. 8, 1961 841 1203 2044 2043** 
**X ote: On Invoice for September 8, 1961, it reflects 
390 head ''short last billing." This number was added 
to the total shown on invoice for week ending Sep-
tetnber 1. 1961. and deducted from invoice for week 
ending Sepetmber 8, 1961. 
*Xote: On Invoice for July 21, 1961, there is a 30 head 
discrepancy "·here respondent 'vas billed for 30 more 
head than killed. On invoice for August 11, 1961, this 
discrepancy is cured by billing for 30 head less than 
killed. 
'fhe t"~o exceptions illustrated by the above chart 
relate to the killing for the weeks ending August 4, 
1961. and August 18, 1961. 'fhe number of animals 
billed August 4 in the amount of 1,584 compares with 
neither the number of lambs nor ewes killed during 
that "l'eek, and respondent cannot explain this discrep-
ancy. For the week ending August 18, 1961, Goldring 
Packing Company "·as billed for 57 more head than 
\vere killed during that week. However, it should be 
noted that the number for 'vhich respondent was billed 
''·as considerably greater than the number of lambs 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only killed during that particular week. The retnaining 
five invoices subject to the adjustments noted on the 
chart reflect the identical total of both lambs and ewes 
killed for the respective week. These billings all were 
paid by respondent. (R. 176). 
ARGUMEN1, 
POINT I. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE OF RECORD TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
It is axiomatic that on this appeal, this court must 
view the evidence below in the light most favorable to 
respondent. Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 383 
P .2d 406 ( 1963) . All of the evidence and every influence 
and intendment fairly arising therefrom should be taken 
in the light most favorable to the finding made by the 
jury below. Rum1nell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137,320 P.2d 
653 (1958). Because the principal thrust of appel-
lant's argument attacks the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the jury's finding of an oral contract, ex-
tracts of pertinent portions of the testimony of respond-
ent's witness, Henry Hendler, are set forth at some 
length, as follows: 
"Q. I asked you to relate the substance of the 
conversation. What was said at that time? 
A. Oh, at that time they were killing or slaugh-
tering, custom slaughtering; and at that time 
they asked me whether I would let them custo~ 
slaughter livestock for our company at their 
plant. 
8 
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(~. \\'hat did you say to that 1 
.._ \. I t houg·ht it \rould be an excellent idea. 
Q. \ r as there any discussion at that time with 
respect to the ter1ns of this slaughtering arrange-
ment1 
'rill~ (_'~QlTl{'f: \'" ou can ans\\·er that 'yes' 
or ~no'. 
'rilE \\rl'fNESS: Yes. 
:\IR. S.t\PERSTEIN: All right, and what 
\ra~ that conversation? 
'fHE \\'I 'fNE S S: We evolved terms as fol-
lo\\'s: 'fhree Dollars for cattle plus inedibles and 
fifty cents for sheep plus inedibles and edibles." 
(R. 169, 170). 
* * * 
'fHE \\TI'l,NESS: All right. Ray McFar-
land, who "·as the spokesman for the group, 
accepted this, and said that would be fine with 
them, and the rest of them all either kept quiet 
or agreed and accepted it. 
)IR. SAPERSTEIN: Did anyone indicate 
any objection to that price? 
'THE \\TITNESS: No. There was a question 
at that time as to whether or not ewes would 
take a long time to kill and for my firm I ex-
plained to them that '"e felt that they could have 
the conde1nned carcasses, because through in-
spection they occasionally condemned carcasses, 
and this would giYe them an extra certain amount 
that they "·auld have the condemned carcasses 
as additional payment for the function which 
they could reduce the meat from, which they 
9 
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seemed to accept. They said they would accept 
it." (R. 172). 
* * * 
MR. SAPERSTEIN: Can you fix the ap-
proximate date as to this conversation? 
THE WITNESS: It was the early part of 
the summer, when this conference was first con-
ceived ,when we made the deal, around May or 
something like that. 
Q. What was said? 
A. I stated to them that we would pay them 
fifty cents to kill sheep and that was our deal 
and that is all that was to be said. And at that 
time they thought they could not function and 
if they didn't want to do it they could terminate 
it and we reserved the right of termination our-
selves. 
Q. What did they say in response to that 
statement? 
A. They accepted it. (R. 180, 181) ." 
* * * 
And on cross-examination: 
"Q. And it was Mr. Ray McFarland who 
spoke up and said he would kill those ewes for 
fifty cents? 
A. The group agreed among themselves and 
discussed it with me and I discussed it with them. 
-· 
Q. But to answer my inquiry: which one per-
son? 
A. I don't remember which one of them; they 
were all speaking to me at that time; each one 
had a little something to say. 
10 
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(~. I think this n1orning you had :\Ir. Ray 
:\lc~,arland saying that he would do it; is that 
true 1 
.l\. lie did tnost of the talking. He was the 
nH>st kn<nvledgeable one of the group. 
(~. \",. ou didn't actually say 'vhether he said 
he ,,·ould do it for fifty cents or not? 
..:\. I know he said it. There 'vas agreement 
a1nong the group and I had a con1plete under-
standing 'vith them. 
* * * 
~IR. l3ERR \T: 'Vhat I 'vould like to be sure 
of is that only )lr. ~IcFarland said he would 
kill thein for fifty cents? 
'filE ''rl'l,NESS: They were all taking part 
in the conversation. Ray did most of the talking 
and the rest of them all had something to say. 
\ y· e "'ere sitting in a group and I was talking to 
then1 and they 'vere talking to me, and I said 
I "·ould give them fifty cents and that was to 
be our price and \ve would not be interested in 
paying anything n1ore. And they accepted indi-
vidually or collectively; they were all sitting 
there and I cannot specifically say that Mr. Mor-
gan said 'yes' and the others didn't say anything 
I don't know. 
* * * 
'fHE ''riTNESS: Ray McFarland agreed 
to it; Leonard Thayer \vas sitting there and 
agreed to it; )[organ, he "·as sitting there and I 
don't know what he said. I think they were all 
sitting· there in front of me and I cannot remem-
ber "·hich one 'vas the spokesman because each 
11 
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one had something to say. But there was a com-
plete meeting of the minds." (R. 185, 186). 
* * * 
"THE WITNESS: They all had something 
to say, how nice it was of me to take an interest 
in their group and how we were all interested in 
getting along together. I was supplementing 
their kill, and I told them they should - they 
were killing on their own and we were not pro-
viding the complete kill for them. They were in 
business and we were supplementing their kill. 
These were parts of the conversation that took 
place and there was agreement. I stated we 
would pay fifty cents to kill sheep, no more. 
Fine. And we would pay Three Dollars to kill 
cattle. Fine. And we all shook hands and went 
about our way." (R. 187}. 
* * * 
''Q. Mr. Hendler, Mr. Berry has searched ' 
your memory to show specifically what one or 
the other said. I realize this was a long time ago, 
but do you recall what objections, if any, were 
made by anyone to this proposal that you stated? 
A. One of the questions asked by one of the 
less informed of the group, as to the mutton kill: 
'Does a ewe kill slower than lambs?' I said, 
'Yes ,they are slower. However, you may have 
the condemned carcasses.' 
* * * 
THE WITNESS: I told them they would 
have the condemned carcasses as additional com-
pensation. 
Q. Did anyone object to the proposition? 
Did anyone stand up and say: 'I will not go 
along with it; or words to that effect? 
12 
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...:\. Xo. 'rher "·ere all Yery pleased that "·e 
''"ere going· to give them material to custom 
slnughter. 
(~ ... \ ud did ~·ou gtYc thern the 1naterial to 
custon1 slaughter? 
.t\. \res, \\'e did. 
D. Did they slaughter1 
1\. \res." ( R. 190, 191). 
'ro the sa1ne effect is the testimony of the defend-
ant. Itay :\lel4'arland, as follows: 
~~(~. Did you at any 1neeting discuss terms 
"·ith )lr. Hendler 'vith respect to this kill? 
..t\. Yes. 
(~. '''hen did this meeting take place when 
you discussed the terms '1 
~\. In the early sun1mer of '61. 
.. . .. 
(~. Do you recall 1nore specifically "Then that 
tnight have been? ''ras it June or July? 
"'\. It \\·as in the first of June or the last of 
l\Iay. 
Q. ,, ... here did this meeting take place? 
A. It took place in the same conference room. 
Q. And who \vas present at that time? 
A . . Jerry ~Iorgan, ''rayne Hodson and Leo-
nard 'fhayer. 
Q. And was _jir. Hendler there? 
... -\.. \"'" es. 
13 
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Q. All right. Now relate the conversation at 
that time with respect to terms. 
( 0 b j ection interposed at this time) 
MR. SAPERSTEIN: All right, now; you 
may answer. 
THE WITNESS: We first started discuss-
ing custom cattle killing, because that was what 
was more in our line at that particular time, and 
we determined upon three dollars a head for 
killing cattle. Then we got into killing sheep~ and 
Mr. Hendler said he would offer. us fifty cents 
a head for killing sheep. 
Q. Who was to retain the pelt? 
A. Goldring was to retain the pelt. 
Q. Who was to have the offal of the sheep? 
A. We were to have the edible and inedible 
offal. 
Q. And what did you say in response to the 
propositon made by Mr. Hendler. 
A. We agreed. 
Q. Was there any comment from any of the 
other individuals present at the time? 
A. They agreed. 
Q. I beg pardon? 
A. They agreed. 
Q. Subsequent to that, Mr. McFarland, did 
the Goldring Packing Company submit sheep 
to be slaughtered there at the McFarland plant? 
A. Yes, later; and we killed cattle. 
Q. Cattle and sheep were submitted to you? 
14 
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"'\. (,orrect. 
(~. ~ \ nd they \vere killed '1 
.. \. 'rlu.'y \vere." (ll. 195, 196~ 197). 
l~:,·idenee substantiating ~Icl~.,arland's and Hend-
ler's testiJnony as to an oral contract having been 
nuule at the rneeting above referred to is contained in 
Exhibit ~~ the series of billings received by respondent 
frorn II ... '\. :\1 l~attle Cotnpany and later, Great West-
ern. 'rhese doctnnents bill respondent for slaughtering 
respondent's e\\'es at the agreed charge of fifty cents 
per head. Although five of the seven invoices use the 
word, \'latnbs", as illustrated, supra, the number of 
unin1nls sho,vn on the invoice was the total of both the 
larnhs and ewes killed in the period covered by the 
billing. Respondent honored these billings by payment 
accordingly. 
'fhe logical import of these invoices is that there 
was a contract bet,veen the parties whereby H & M 
Cattle Cotnpany was to kill ewes at the rate of fifty 
l'ents per head. Other,vise, H & M, and later, Great 
,, ... estern, \Vould presumably have billed respondent at 
some other figure. All of the invoices, with one excep-
tion. \vere prepared by a Mr. W. Dennis Couch, a 
\vitness ealled by appellant, who was, in his own words, 
"office manager. collections manager, and the general 
fellow to run the plant." (R. 252, 253). Mr. Couch 
adn1itted on cross-examination that at the time in ques-
tion he had about "five different bosses," including Jerry 
)!organ. Leonard Thayer, ''rayne Hodson, Roy Mor-
15 
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gan, all of whom were principals in either H & M Cattle 
Company or the appellant, Great Western Packing 
and Cattle Company, or both. (R. 255, Ex. 3, Ex. 4). 
Couch, despite his protestations to the effect that he 
had been advised by his "bosses" only with respect to 
the agreement between the parties as to the amount 
to be charged for killing lambs and killing cattle, but 
not ewes, he nevertheless admitted that he did not bill 
respondent more than fifty cents for ewes because he 
knew an amount in excess of fifty cents would not be 
paid. ( R. 258, 259) . 
As discussed infra, these invoices have additional 
significance as part of the acts, conduct and declarations 
of H & M Cattle Company, which conduct and decla-
rations per se may properly be considered by the jury 
as an acceptance of respondent's offer. 
That the oral agreement existed is given further 
credence by Hendler's testimony that appellant termi-
nated the agreement because it could not "economically 
kill at fifty cents per head." (R. 182). Appellant ex-
plains that this statement related only to lambs, a con-
tention the jury justifiably rejected in light of the fact 
that it was made after appellant and H & M had ad-
mittedly killed 8,151 ewes. 
It is submitted that the evidence relative to the 
meeting between Hendler and the principals of H & M 
Cattle Company, standing alone, was amply sufficient 
for the jury to determine that an oral agreement for 
the killing of ewes at the rate of fifty cents a head had 
16 
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been struck at the titne of the meeting. \ \rhen this evi-
dence is vie\\·ed in the light of the undisputed fact that 
s, I.> 1 e\ves 'vere, in fact, killed and that respondent 
was billed for tnost of this number (no billings were 
recei,·ed for the \veeks ending September 15 and Sep-
teinher ~~) at the rate of fifty cents per head, appellant's 
nrgurnent, it is submitted, is somewhat less than com• 
pelling. 
It is further submitted that the jury could have 
nlso based its finding of an oral contract by viewing 
II & ~I's conduct in killing Goldring ewes, charging 
fifty cents per head therefor, and accepting payment 
paytnent thereof, as constituting an acceptance of the 
offer made by respondent at the May meeting. 
\ \rhether the contract be bilateral or unilateral, it 
is respectfully submitted that there is substantial evi-
dence to support the jury's finding that there was, in 
fact, an oral agreement to kill ewes at fifty cents per 
head . 
..-\.ppellant attacks the foregoing evidence as being 
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the jury's find-
ing of an oral contract between the parties. This attack 
is based essentially upon four assertions: 
(I) That the offer made by Goldring was made to 
a "group'', not H & M Cattle Company as such, and 
that, therefore, H & l\1 Cattle Company could not 
accept the offer, not being the offeree; 
(2) That the period from 1\'Iay to August 17, 
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1964, the date of the written agreement (Exhibit 
5), was simply a period of negotiation and that the 
offer made by Goldring with respect to the killing of 
ewes at fifty cents per head was not only rejected hr 
the defendants but revoked by respondent prior to 
acceptance ; 
(3) That since there is no testimony to the effect 
that one or more of the principals of H & M Cattle 
Company by name said, '"I accept", the silence of the 
individuals involved cannot be construed as an accept-
ance; and 
( 4) That the only evidence of record to substan-
tiate the finding of an oral contract are the "conclu-
sions" of the witness Hendler. 
Taking each of these contentions in their order 
above stated, let us first examine the proposition ad-
vanced that there can be no oral contract as a matter of 
law because the offer made by Goldring Packing Com-
pany was not accepted by the offeree. This assertion 
is based upon the fallacious assumption that the offer 
made by respondent at the meeting in May of 1961 
was made to some shapeless entity yet to be formed. 
The facts are, of course, otherwise. The offer was made 
to the individuals present, four of whom were officers 
and principals of H & 1\ti Cattle Company, one of 
whom was subsequently an incorporator and president 
of the appellant Great Western Packing and Cattle 
Company. The meeting was held with these persons 
because through H & M they were and would be the 
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ones operuting the ~Ic~.,arland plant; and these indi-
viduals through the entities of H & :\1 l'1attle Company 
and (~rent \\"'estern Packing and Cattle Company, did, 
in fact, then and thereafter operate the ~IcFarland 
plant. 'ro say, therefore, that no offer 'vas made to 
II & ~I l"'attle Con1pany is not only to ignore the reali-
ties of the situation apparent from the record, but to 
sotneho'v argue for a separation of a corporate entity 
fron1 its flesh and blood agents. In so doing, appellant 
is foisting upon this court its own view of the evidence, 
not the vie"' to "' hich the evidence is susceptible and to 
which obv·iously the jury subscribed. See Ortega v. 
Thomas, supra. 
)loreover, appellant misconceives thP. application 
of the rule of la"r 'vhich it attempts to assert. No one 
'rill quarrel "·ith appellant's assertion that if X makes 
an offer for services to be performed by Y, and Z seeks 
to perfor1n those services, that X cannot be bound 
absent his consent. The reason for the rule is that X 
is entitled to contract with whomsoever he pleases. How-
ever, applying this doctrine to the instant case, appel-
lant places itself in the peculiar position of urging the 
court to defeat the rights of the offeror by a rule of law 
clearly developed to preserve the rights of the offeror. 
The point is that under any view of the evidence, 
respondent "·as obviously "pleased" to deal with H & M 
Cattle Con1pany and accepted the tendered perform-
ance by H & ~I. The rule is one devised for the pro-
tection of the offeror not for the protection of the 
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acceptor; and if a stranger to the offer perfortns in 
accordance therewith, and the offeror permits perfornl-
ance, the tender of the performance is in essence a new 
offer and the receipt of the performance is an accept-
ance thereof. I Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed., Sec. 
80, p. 265. Accordingly, even under appellant's view of 
the evidence, a binding contract resulted. 
With respect to appellant's second contention, it 
is once again rather clear that this contention is also 
grounded upon certain assumptions that can be made 
only by viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the appellant, not the respondent. The written con-
tract (Ex. 5) introduced by appellant, according to 
appellant's own theory of the case, is silent with respect 
to the killing of ewes. It is therefore difficult to per-
ceive how it can ipso facto constitute either a rejection 
or a revocation of an offer concerning a subject matter it 
does not purport to cover; and the jury was, therefore, 
properly given the opportunity to supplement the same 
by finding an oral agreement with respect to ewes in ac-
cordance with respondent's evidence. McCarren v. Mer-
rill_, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 389 P .2d 732, 733, (March, I964) ; 
Charlton v. Hackett_, II Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176, 
( 1961). 
· This argument also overlooks the rather elemen-
tary precept that when an offer is accepted, a contract 
results, and accordingly, there is no longer extant an 
offer to be either revoked or rejected. The bargain 'vith 
H & M had been struck long before August I7, 1961. 
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~:\s discussed, supra, the jury could haYe found an 
uct·cptance ot' respondent's offer at either the meeting 
of the pnrties in )lay or by the killing of respondent's 
ewes in July and thereafter and the billing therefor upon 
respondent's terms. 
'ro say that the written contract, appellant's Ex-
hibit 6, conclusively proves that the parties were merely 
negotiating from May to August 17, 1961, is to once 
again ignore the evidence of record detailed above, to 
\vit: the meeting in May, the actual submission of ewes 
by respondent to H & M and the slaughtering thereof 
before and after August 17, 1961, the date of the agree-
rnent; and the billings therefor at the rate of fifty cents 
per head in accordance with respondent's offer. 
\\rith respect to appellant's third contention enum-
erated above, once again appellant requires respondent 
to argue facts rather than law. rrhis contention assumes, 
of course, that there was, in fact, silence upon the part 
of the principal officers of H & M Cattle Company 
in response to the offer made by Hendler during the 
)lay meeting. It is respectfully submitted that the jury 
could readily infer from the testimony of record de-
tailed above that there was acceptance by all of the 
parties present at the time of the meeting. Assuming 
arguendo only, that H & M was silent, appellant erro-
neously assumes that there was no duty to speak on 
the part of the principals of H & ~1 Cattle Company. 
It is respectfully submitted that in logic and good 
reason "·herft_ an offer is made to five persons, so closely 
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inter-related in the operation of the packing plant as 
were those five at that meeting in May, if the principals 
of H & M Cattle Company were not to be bound by 
an acceptance of the offer made at the time of this con-
ference, then in light of all the facts and circumstances 
then existing and the interrelationship of those present, 
they were duty bound to so state. I Williston on Con-
tracts, 3rd Ed., Sec. 91B, P. 328. The evidence is un-
disputed that no one voiced an objection to such accept-
ance or to doing business with respondent upon the 
terms offered by Hendler. The evidence, moreover, is 
abundant that such business was in fact thereafter 
conducted with Goldring Packing Company upon the 
basis of the very terms proposed at the meeting. 
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, 
that there was not an acceptance at the date of the 
conference in May, the evidence, as discussed, supra, 
shows an acceptance of the offer made by the subsequent 
conduct of H & M Cattle Company; and therefore, 
there is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to sustain the 
jury's finding, even assuming appellant's own view of 
the evidence to be correct. An offer was made by Hend-
ler whereby ewes were to be submitted for slaughter 
at the rate of fifty cents per head. Thereafter, ewes 
were in fact submitted to H & M Cattle Company for 
slaughter. H & M Cattle Company slaughtered the 
ewes and billed for its services at the rate of fifty cents 
per head. It is difficult to imagine an acceptance by 
more unequivocal conduct than this. Appellant's entire 
thesis on this appeal seems to be that an oral contract 
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is i1npossihle to be for1ned in the absence of the offeree 
raising his hand, standing upon his feet and stating 
with due forrnality, "I accept your offer; we now have 
a contract." 'fhis thesis not only ignores the realities of 
the business \vorld in general and the meat packing 
business in particular, but it ignores, as well, the estab-
lished la"· on the subject. 'fhe authorities are unani-
rnous in holding that conduct may constitute an accept-
ance. RadletJ v. S11tith, 6 Utah 2d 31-:t, 313 P.2d 465, 
(19t>7): R. ,J. Dau1n Constr·uction Co. v. Child~ 122 
trtah 194, 2 t7 P.2d 817 ( 1952) ; 'l'hornton v. Pasch_, 
104 Utah 313, 139 P.2d 1002, 1003 ( 1943); In re 
/Jan.gdon·'s Estate, 195 P.2d 317 (Kan., 1948}. In the 
last cited case, the court pronounced the rule in the 
following appropriate language: 
~·It is true no exp~ess 'vritten agreement was 
shown but that was unnecessary. Parties may 
be bound as firmly by implied contracts ·as by 
those expressed in words, oral or written. The 
la"· itnplies fro1n circumstances and the silent 
language of men's conduct and actions, contracts 
and promises as forcible and binding as those 
made by express words or through the medium 
of \vritten memorials." 
The fourth contention made by the appellant is 
that the only evidence of record to substantiate the 
finding of a parol contract was the testimony of Mr. 
Hendler and that his testimony with respect to show-
ing such an acceptance constitutes his opinions or con-
clusions only. Not only does appellant ignore the testi-
mony of Ray )lcFarland, but once again, appellant 
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ignores the concept that conduct may constitute accept-
ance and in so doing ignores the evidence relating 
thereto that has been reiterated so many times in this 
brief. 
Hendler's and McFarland's testimony relating to 
acceptance at the meeting supplied the jury with the 
basis for an alternative finding of acceptance. It was 
not the only evidence of record. As indicated above, the 
evidence relating to acceptance by conduct is also ample 
to support the jury's verdict. Additionally, it is sub-
mitted that much of the testimony quoted above did 
not constitute bald conclusions. Much of this testimony 
is as susceptible of the interpretation that what is being 
recited was what was actually said as it is susceptible 
of appellant's contention that it is the witness's mental 
impressions only. As stated at 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, 
Sec. 771: 
"The general rule excluding opinions of wit-
nesses is simple in statement, but not so simple 
in application, for it is not always easy to dis-
tinguish in the testimony of a witness facts 
within his knowledge or observation from his 
opinions on facts. As a general rule, a witness 
may testify directly to a compq,site fact although 
in a sense his testimony may include his con-
clusion from other facts. * * * The true solution 
seems to be that such questions are left for the 
practical discretion of the trial court." 
Moreover, assuming arguendo only, that Hendler's 
testimony with respect to acceptance of his offer at the 
time of the meeting was principally conclusions, all 
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ot' the testin1ouy quoted, ~upra, \Vas recei,·ed without 
uhjection or tnotion tu strike by appellant and a great 
denl ot' it \vas actually elicited on cross-examination., 
It is '"ell-established hnv that objections not made to 
the adtnissihility of such evidence are lost on appeal; 
and such evidence, though constituting conclusions, in 
the absence of objection, is competent to support the 
jury's findings. 
20 .i-\m. J ur., Evidence, Sec. 1185, states the rule 
us follows : 
"'I'he fact that evidence which is introduced 
in a case may be, if objected to, incompetent 
evidence under some one or more exclusionary 
rule of evidence, do~s not destroy its probative 
effect if it is admitted without objection. It is the 
generally prevailing rule that relevant evidence 
received \vithout objection may properly be con-
sidered, although it would have been excluded 
if objection had been made. Such evidence, where 
admitted 'vithout objection, has the force and 
effect of proper evidence and is to be accorded 
its natural probative effect as though it were 
adtnissible under the established rules of prac-
tice." 
At the annotation appearing at 120 A.L.R 213, it 
is stated that the overwhelming majority of the cases 
in this country on the subject agree that objectionable 
conclusion evidence should be given consideration in 
ruling upon a motion for non-suit or directed verdict. 
4-\nd, in 5 Am. J ur. 2d, Appeal and Error, Sec. 737, 
p. 182, the rule is stated thusly: 
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"Where evidence, although inadmissible on 
proper objection, is received below without ob-
jection, the court, on appeal, may properly con-
sider it in support of the decision of the trial 
court.'' 
POIN'f 2. EXHIBIT 2 WAS PROPERL"\r 
ADMITTED OVER APPELLANT'S OBJEC-
TION THAT IT WAS HEARSAY. 
Appellant contends that the billings contained in 
Exhibit 2 constitute hearsay testimony and that the 
same were improperly admitted over objection. As 
pointed out earlier in this brief, these billings, together 
with other conduct by H & M, could per se have been 
considered by the jury as constituting the acceptance 
of Hendler's offer. When thus viewed, the billings take 
on an importance independent of the declarations 
therein contained. The very fact that these billings were 
rendered now becomes significant. Much like a verbal 
utterance of acceptance, the fact that the utterance 
was made, not the truth or falsity thereof, is the purpose 
of the testimony. It was stated by this court in Hawkins 
v. Perry~ 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372, 374 (1953}, as 
follows: 
" * * * Perry's statements at the time of the 
transaction were not declarations as to some 
antecedent happening which the percipient wit-
nesses are relating to us second-hand. They are 
the verbal acts which go to make up the very 
transaction which is under scrutiny to determine 
its legal effect. The fact that promises and rep-
resentations were made is material to the issues 
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of this aetion; thev do not e,·idence 'the truth 
of the tna tter * * .. * asserted therein * * *,' at 
least in the sense that \ \rigmore uses that phrase. 
. . . " 
'fhe foll<nving pronouncement by the Supreme 
Court of Colorado is also appropriate here: 
~' * * * In ulti1nately excluding exhibit B, the 
court as like,vise did plaintiff's counsel in ob-
jecting to the court's admission of exhibits C 
and D, misapprehend the purpose of these ex-
hibits. 1\s already noted the company is relying 
upon its oral contract, and plaintiff denies any 
such contract. 'Vhere the existence of an alleged 
oral contract is the main issue involved in a case, 
as here, and the making of the 'oral contract is 
disputed, all the acts and declarations of the 
parties tending to establish or refute it are ad-
missible, together with all the facts connected 
with the history of the transaction, and the sur-
rounding· circumstances. * * * ' The obtaining 
of exhibits B, c., a:q<J D tend·s strongly to estab-
lish the oral contract upon which defendant re-
lies." Andrenw 'L'. Costilla -Ditch Co., 165 P.2d 
188, (Colo., 1945). 
Assunling arguendo only, that these billings con-
stituted hearsay in the sense that their introductior1 
\\·as for the purpose of establishing the tr~th of the 
declarations contained therein, they were properly 
adnussible on the basis of the most elementary exception 
to the hearsay rule, to wit: as admissions against in-
terest. 'fhese billings were prepared by W. Dennis 
Couch, who as the statement of facts above indicates, 
\Vas in fact the plant manager, the person who ran the 
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office, and the person responsible for obtaining money 
to keep the plant in operation during this period. llis 
bosses were all principals of H & M Cattle Com-
pany and later the principals of the respondent Great 
Western Packing and Cattle Company. It was his duty 
to raise money, his duty to bill for services performed. 
In pursuit of his duty, he had admittedly billed Gold-
ring Packing Company on H & M Cattle Company 
statements over the assumed name of H & M Dressed 
Beef Company. To say, as appellant says, that these 
billings were not sent out in the course and scope of 
Couch's employment and to say further that Couch 
was not an agent of H & M Cattle Company and later 
Great Western Packing and Cattle Company, the 
appellant, is once again to pervert the facts on this 
appeal. 'Vhere a declaration is made by an agent acting 
within the course and scope of his employment that 
declaration is clearly admissible as against the principal 
as an admission against interest. 20 Am. J ur., Evi-
dence, Sec. 596, p. 505; John G. Hendrie Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission~ 12 Utah 2d 80, 362 P.2d 752 (1961). 
Appellant, however, argues that Couch testified 
that he was never advised that there was a contract 
between H & M Cattle Company and respondent with 
respect to the killing ewes. Such testimony would 
affect the weight to be given to the documents, not 
their admissibility. Moreover, it is apparent that the 
jury, as was its province, rejected Couch's assertion. 
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'rhe cotnment of Justice l,rockett In the case of 
JlcCarren ·cs. Jlcrrill, supra, seems appropriate In 
summation of this brief: 
uThe resolution of the dispute in this case is 
governed by the old and oft repeated rule that 
where the evidence is in conflict, it is the trial 
court's prerogatiYe to believe that which he finds 
more convincing, and his findings will not be 
disturbed on appeal so long as there is some sub-
stantial evidence to support them." 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the 
judgment entered below be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Herschel J. Saperstein 
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City II, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Dated: )lay 27, 1964. 
,., 
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